Housing Markets and Current Account Dynamics by Gete, Pedro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Housing Markets and Current Account
Dynamics
Pedro Gete
Georgetown University, Instituto de Empresa
June 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25219/
MPRA Paper No. 25219, posted 20. September 2010 17:02 UTC
Housing Markets and Current Account Dynamics
Pedro Getey
September, 2010
Abstract
This paper makes two contributions. On the theory side, I show that increases in the
demand for housing may generate trade decits without need for the standard ingredi-
ents used by others to model housing (wealth e¤ects or trade in capital goods). Housing
is a durable good that must be locally produced. If the desire to smooth consumption
across goods is su¢ ciently strong, countries import tradable goods during periods when
more domestic labor is devoted to produce nontradables to smooth consumption between
tradables and nontradables. Housing booms are larger if the country can run a trade
decit because the decit lowers the opportunity cost of building, which is the foregone
consumption of tradable goods due to reallocation of labor to the construction sector. On
the empirical side, I provide two types of evidence to support the theory. First, I show that
using the cross-country dynamics of employment in construction as the explanatory vari-
able, the model generates current account dynamics matching recent global imbalances.
Second, I use sign restrictions implied by the model to estimate a vector autoregression.
The results for a sample of OECD economies suggest that housing demand shocks matter
for current account dynamics through the channel explained before.
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1 Introduction
What explains recent current account dynamics? This question has attracted a lot of
attention because in the decade previous to the recent nancial crisis, the U.S. and some
other developed economies run large and persistent current account decits, often referred to
as global imbalances. This paper makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the
debate. On the theory side, I show that shocks to the demand for housing generate trade
decits without need for the standard ingredients used by others to model housing (wealth
e¤ects or trade in capital goods). Countries import tradable goods during periods when more
domestic labor is devoted to produce nontradables to smooth consumption between tradables
and nontradables. Housing booms are larger if the country can run a trade decit because the
decit lowers the opportunity cost of building, which is the foregone consumption of tradable
goods due to reallocation of labor to the construction sector. On the empirical side, I provide
two types of evidence to support that cross-country heterogeneity in housing demand help to
explain the global imbalances through this theoretical channel.
Heterogeneity in housing demand is an unexplored explanation for the global imbalances
that is appealing for three reasons1. First, as I document in Section 2, there are large cross
country di¤erences in housing dynamics and these di¤erences strongly correlate with current ac-
count dynamics (especially for housing quantities, such as labor share in construction or value
added by this sector). Alternative theories of the global imbalances have problems explain-
ing the substantial heterogeneity in the current account dynamics of developed and emerging
economies2. Second, a large part of the current account decits were nanced through sales of
mortgage related products (Shin 2008 discusses the U.S. case, The Telegraph 2008 the Spanish
case). It is unclear why, in the absence of shocks increasing the demand for funds from the
housing sector, foreigners should express such a strong preference for mortgage products, es-
pecially when in most countries they contained low quality subprime assets not backed up by
public guarantees. Finally, housing specic factors may have important aggregate implications
1To my knowledge only Matsuyama (1990), Punzi (2008), Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) and Laibson and
Mollerstrom (2010) have related housing and current account dynamics. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) is a
regression study that documents a strong positive association between current account decits and the ap-
preciation of real estate prices without providing evidence on causation. Matsuyama (1990) is a theoretical
study of the current account consequences of income e¤ects on residential investment. Punzi (2008) explains
the relationship with a two country version of Iacoviello (2005) model of housing wealth e¤ects. Laibson and
Mollerstrom (2010) also focus on aggregate wealth e¤ects.
2For example, theories based on di¤erences in nancial development or in income growth face the problem
that several countries similar across these dimensions had very di¤erent current account patterns (Eichengreen
2006, Gruber and Kamin 2009, Roubini 2006). Models focused on U.S.-specic factors cannot explain why large
and persistent decits have not being a U.S. specic pattern, i.e., several other developed economies have had
a similar persistent downward trend, with decits reaching similar levels of GDP.
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because the housing sector is large. For example, in the U.S. from 2001 to 2006, the housing
contribution to total employment growth was at least 28% from residential construction and at
least 41% when mortgage nance, real estate agents, construction materials etc. are included
(The Economist 2005; Roubini 2006b).
The two standard ways to connect housing and the trade balance are trade on investment
goods (trade decits generated by investment booms), and aggregate wealth e¤ects of housing
on consumption. The model that I present does not have aggregate wealth e¤ects, nor capital
goods. Instead, it focuses on consumption smoothing across goods to link residential activity
to current account dynamics. This channel is not mentioned in the literature but is appealing
for two empirical reasons. First, there is a lack of consensus on the magnitude and sign of
aggregate housing wealth e¤ects (see, for discussion, Buiter 2008, Muellbauer 2007 and Kiyotaki
et al. 2007; Congressional Budget O¢ ce 2007 surveys recent U.S. studies). Second, in the U.S.
net imports of capital goods account for a smaller fraction of the decit dynamics than do
net imports of consumption goods. Net imports of consumer goods are twice the net imports
of capital goods and their downward trend has accelerated since the mid 1990s. This fact
suggests that consumption smoothing may be a more important driving force of trade decits
that capital dynamics. Moreover, most of the capital employed to build houses is not tradable.
Burstein et al. (2004) report that the share of construction gross output attributable to tradable
materials was at most 24% in France in 1995, 19% in the U.K. in 1998 and 31% in the U.S. in
1997.
I set up a simple model to illustrate why consumption smoothing across goods and the
opportunity costs associated with building are enough to generate trade decits after an increase
in housing demand. There are two goods in the model, houses and tradable goods. Houses
are nontradable and durable. Each country has a xed supply of labor that can allocate to
produce either tradable goods or new houses. The tradable good is identical for both countries,
thus there is only intertemporal trade. I assume exogenous shifts of the aggregate preferences
towards housing. These shifts increase the demand for housing relative to other goods. To
increase the quantity consumed, the economy has to move labor from producing tradable goods
to constructing houses. This labor reallocation implies the opportunity cost of building new
houses, which is the foregone production of tradable goods. Trade decits lower this cost
because they decouple consumption from production. By importing consumer tradables the
economy can reduce its production of tradables while still consuming them. Thus trade decits
allow for smooth consumption across goods while building more at a faster pace. Hence housing
booms are larger when the economy can run a trade decit.
On the empirical side, the contribution of this paper is to show that cross-country het-
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erogeneity in housing demand helps to explain the global imbalances through the theoretical
channel discussed before. This paper does not study the causes of the heterogeneity in housing
dynamics3; this is taken as given and captured via exogenous housing demand shocks (shocks
to the aggregate marginal rate of substitution between housing and tradables). Several papers
provide housing demand arguments that could explain the cross-country heterogeneity. We can
think of them as micro-foundations for the demand shocks of this paper: bubbles, demographic
changes, deregulation or innovation in mortgage markets, loosened lending standards, public
policies to increase homeownership or preference changes between single and multi-unit houses4.
Moreover, DSGE models of housing attribute a signicant part of the recent housing dynamics
to domestic preference shocks (Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal 2010a; Iacoviello and Neri 2010).
I provide two types of evidence to support my theory. First, in a parameterized version of the
model using the housing variables as explanatory variables, the model predicts global imbalances
similar to those observed in the data. Second, the model provides sign restrictions to identify
housing demand shocks that a¤ect the economy through the consumption smoothing channel:
conditional on a positive shock, the correlation between the shock, interest rates, housing prices,
employment in construction and residential investment is positive. Moreover, the conditional
correlation of the shock with tradable consumption is negative. As I discuss in Section 6 these
sign restrictions di¤er from those implied by alternative theories. For example, the savings glut
hypothesis, or interest rate shocks from lower risk premiums, predict negative comovement of
housing and interest rates (Caballero et al. 2008). Sector specic technology shocks do not
imply increases in both house prices and residential investment. Neutral technology shocks or
discount factor shocks (a standard way to generate aggregate wealth e¤ects) do not generate
negative comovement of housing and tradable consumption for several periods because if both
housing and tradable consumption are normal goods then higher income, or higher impatience,
increase householdsdemand for both goods, thus generating positive comovement (Aspachs-
Bracons and Rabanal 2010b, Punzi 2008). Using these sign restrictions I estimate a vector
autoregression for a sample of OECD economies. The results suggest that housing shocks and
the consumption smoothing channel matter for the dynamics of the trade balance.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents some facts on housing and current
account dynamics. Section 3 describes the model. In Section 4, to illustrate the essence of
3This is still an open question. See Andre (2010), Glaeser et al. (2010) and Mayer and Hubbard (2008) for
recent discussion of alternative explanations.
4As additional evidence, Doms and Krainer (2007) examine data from American Housing Surveys between
1997 and 2005 and report a substantial increase in the share of household income devoted to housing and the
propensity for households to own their homes. They nd that these results hold true across all income quintiles,
ages and education levels. They do not depend on market location; that is, the higher expenditures do not
simply reect higher house prices, but a general increase in the demand for housing.
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the mechanism I rst characterize the equilibrium of a two period model with full housing
depreciation, then I parameterize the model of Section 3 and perform impulse response analysis.
Section 5 shows how the model can account for recent patterns of global imbalances. Section
6 estimates a vector autoregression using the sign restrictions implied by the model. Section 7
concludes.
2 Motivating facts
In this section I present three types of evidence motivating my model. First, over the
period of the global imbalances there has been substantial heterogeneity in the current account
dynamics of developed economies with several countries running large and persistent decits.
Second, over this period there is a strong negative cross-country correlation between housing
and current account dynamics. Third, net imports of consumer goods are twice the net imports
of capital goods and their downward trend has accelerated since the mid 1990s.
2.1 Two facts about current account dynamics
First, large and persistent decits are not a U.S.-specic pattern, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Several other developed economies have had a persistent downward trend similar to that of the
United States, with decits reaching similar levels of GDP.
Second, there has been substantial heterogeneity in the current account dynamics of de-
veloped economies. Table 1 reports this5: while the countries on the left panel moved into
surpluses, those in the right panel moved into decits. The heterogeneity within Europe is
especially interesting, because the European Union as a whole had a nearly balanced current
account6.
5In the U.S. and most of the OECD countries the housing boom lasted from around 1994 to 2006 (Andre
2010)
6There is also a puzzling pattern among emerging economies (IMF 2008). Most of Emerging Asia moved into
current account surpluses while emerging Europe moved into current account decits. In this paper I only used
data from the OECD. Anecdotal evidence suggests that emerging markets also followed the patterns reported
in Figure 2.
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Fig. 1. Ratio of current account to GDP for Australia, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.
Table 1: Current account as % of GDP
Rising surpluses Growing decits
1994 2006 1994 2006
Austria -1.47 1.9 Australia -4.9 -5.49
Germany -1.41 4 France 0.54 -2.59
Japan 2.75 3.9 Ireland 2.69 -1.04
Korea -0.95 1.6 Italy 1.18 -2.07
Netherlands 4.75 9.52 Spain -1.23 -8.86
Switzerland 6.22 13.5 Portugal -2.31 -9.58
Canada -2.3 3.34 UK -0.99 -2.45
Sweden 1.13 6.7 USA -1.71 -7.24
6
2.2 Housing and current account dynamics
Global imbalances grew almost monotonically from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s. OECD
data show a strong negative cross-country correlation between housing and current account
dynamics over this period. The correlations are particularly strong for variables related to the
quantity of housing, such as the share of labor employed in construction or the value added
by this sector, and are weaker for price variables, such as the real price of housing. Figure 2
illustrates these facts for a sample of seventeen OECD countries between 1994 and 2006. For
most countries these are the dates during which housing variables grew monotonically (Andre
2010). Given the trend behavior of the time series, I concentrate on the changes between these
two dates. This provides a good idea of the size of the changes.
The three panels of Figure 2 plot on the vertical axis the change in percentage points in
the current account to GDP ratio. The top, middle and bottom panels plot respectively on
the horizontal axis the percentage change in the labor share in construction, the percentage
change in the share of value added by the construction sector and the percentage change in
an index of real housing prices. Countries that experienced housing booms also had larger
current account decits. The scatterplots also show substantial heterogeneity in the behavior
of housing markets among OECD countries. The model in this paper uses this heterogeneity
to explain the di¤erences in current account balances reported in Table 1.
2.3 The importance of consumption goods in the U.S. trade decit
Net imports of capital goods account for a smaller fraction of the decit dynamics than
do net imports of consumption goods. This is shown in Figure 3, which decomposes the time
series for the U.S. trade balance in goods in di¤erent groups: autos, capital goods, consumption
goods and energy. Net imports of consumer goods are twice the net imports of capital goods and
their downward trend has accelerated since the mid 1990s. This fact suggests that consumption
smoothing may be a more important driving force of trade decits than capital dynamics.
3 The Model
In this section I describe a simple model that is consistent with the previous facts: increases
in the demand for housing will imply trade decits through net imports of consumption goods
to smooth consumption.
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Fig. 2. Percentage changes in labor share in construction, in value added by construction,
and in real housing prices versus the percentage-points change in the ratio of the CA to GDP
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Fig. 3. Decomposition of the U.S. trade balance in goods by type of good
3.1 Technology and preferences
There are two countries with the same preferences and technologies. Labor (n) is the only
production input and it can be used to produce new houses (yh) or tradable goods (yc) : The
tradable good is identical for both countries, hence there is only intertemporal trade. The
production functions in country i are
yiht = An

iht (1)
yict = n

ict (2)
where  2 (0; 1).
Houses (h) are durable and nontradable. They give a ow of housing services proportional
to the stock. Houses can be consumed in the same period as they are built (in the next section
I will calibrate the model to a ve year period). The stock of houses depreciate geometrically
at rate h 2 (0; 1), and its law of motion is
hit = (1  h)hit 1 + yiht (3)
Labor is mobile between both sectors with no adjustment costs, but it cannot move between
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countries. Feasibility implies that world production of tradable goods must equal world con-
sumption of tradable goods. Moreover, labor allocated to each sector must sum to the total
labor endowment (ni). The resource constraints areX
i
cit =
X
i
yict (4)
niht + nict = ni (5)
There is an innitely lived representative household in each country who enjoys consumption
of housing and tradable goods without any home bias. They supply labor inelastically in their
home country. The representative household in country i maximizes utility over consumption
of housing services (hit) and tradable goods (cit)
1X
t=0
tu (cit; hit) (6)
I assume the standard constant relative risk aversion functional form over a constant elas-
ticity of substitution aggregator of housing services and tradable consumption
u (cit; hit) =

((1  it)c
" 1
"
it + ith
" 1
"
it )
"
" 1
1  1

1  1

(7)
where  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (IES) as well as the inverse of the coe¢ -
cient of relative risk aversion, " is the static or intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
housing and tradable consumption (SES), and it 2 (0; 1) is a country-specic parameter that
controls the share of consumption of housing services in total expenditure.
3.2 Equilibrium
Since there are no distortions, the set of competitive equilibria can be traced out by solving
for the Pareto optima. Thus, a competitive equilibrium is the solution to the problem of a world
planner who maximizes the weighted utility of both countries
1X
t=0
X
i
i
tu (cit; hit)
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subject to equations (1)  (5) for country weights i: I focus on the equilibrium associated with
1 = 2 = 1: These weights give the same allocations that arise in a competitive equilibrium in
which the representative household in country i has no initial debts, owns the initial stock of
houses in country i; and all the labor income in country i.
If we denote by 'it the Lagrange Multiplier associated with (3) ; the FOCs of the problem
are
uc (c1t; h1t) = uc (c2t; h2t) (8)
'it = uh (cit; hit) + (1  h)'it+1 i = 1; 2 (9)
'it
yiht
niht
= uc(cit; hit)
yict
nict
i = 1; 2 (10)
Equation (8) implies that both countries must value equally one extra unit of the tradable
good in equilibrium. Equation (9) captures that the marginal utility of the durable good
expands over several periods. Finally, equation (10) says that at any interior equilibrium each
country must be indi¤erent between allocating labor to one sector or to the other, i.e. the
marginal utility of housing multiplied by the labor productivity in that sector must equal the
marginal utility of tradable consumption multiplied by the labor productivity in the tradable
sector.
4 Increases in Housing Demand and Trade Decits
This section studies the e¤ects of transitory shocks that increase the preference for housing
relative to tradable goods. I rst characterize the equilibrium of a two period model with
full housing depreciation. This exercise illustrates the key ingredients of the mechanism: the
nontradability of housing and a low intratemporal elasticity of substitution between housing
and tradable consumption. I then conrm the results by performing impulse response analysis
in a multiperiod version of the model.
4.1 A two period model with no durable good
In this subsection I consider a two period version of the model with full housing depreci-
ation, h = 1: When N1N2 is very small we can think of country 1 as a small open economy, i.e.
shocks in country 1 have no e¤ect on the world interest rate (R) : For the rest of the subsection
I focus on country 1 and drop the notation i: I will compare the di¤erences between the equi-
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librium in a closed economy and that in a small open economy after an unanticipated change
in the share of housing in the rst period utility (1). In the closed economy the interest rate
is endogenous while in the small open economy it is exogenous.
Also, to reduce notation I assume that the household in country 1 is both the producer and
the consumer. Thus, in the competitive equilibrium she maximizes
U(c1; h1; c2; h2)  u(c1; h1) + u (c2; h2) (11)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint in terms of tradable goods
c1 +
c2
R
= yc1 +
yc2
R
(12)
and to equations (1) ; (2) ; (5) and
ht = yht for t = 1; 2 (13)
The FOCs are the Euler equation and the equalization of the marginal rate of substitution with
the marginal rate of transformation
uc(c1; h1) = Ruc(c2; h2) (14)
uh(ct; ht)
yht
nht
= uc(ct; ht)
yct
nct
for t = 1; 2 (15)
In a closed economy there is not an option to transfer tradable consumption across periods,
so production and consumption of tradable goods must be equal in every period
ct = yct for t = 1; 2 (16)
The equilibrium of the closed economy in period 1 is characterized by
uh(yc1; yh1)
uc(yc1; yh1)
=
nh1
yh1
yc1
nc1
(17)
The upper left panel of Figure 4 graphs this condition. The left hand side of equation (17) is
the slope of the indi¤erence curve, which, at the initial equilibrium point A, is tangent to the
Frontier of Possibilities of Production (FPP), whose slope is the right hand side of equation
(17).
An unexpected increase in 1 decreases the slope of the indi¤erence curves as graphed in the
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upper right panel of Figure 4. The household now likes housing more, hence she asks for more
tradable goods per unit of housing. The shift of the indi¤erence curves moves the equilibrium
from point A to point B, where consumption of housing services is higher

~hc1 > h


and
consumption of tradable goods lower (~cc1 < c
). There are two reasons why consumption of
tradable goods is lower. One comes directly from the preference shock; the household now likes
tradable goods relatively less, hence she consumes less of them. The second comes from the
opportunity cost of building; to increase the consumption of housing services the country needs
to move along the FPP, reducing production of tradable goods.
The closed economy is a sequence of static problems. An increase in 1 does not alter second
period variables. The unexpected increase in 1 moves the closed economy equilibrium from
point A to point B, but cc2 remains at steady state value c
: I am interested in the case when
the marginal utility of tradable consumption in the rst period increases after an increase in
1, i.e., when even if the preference shock makes tradable goods less appetizing, their marginal
value in period 1 increases because the household likes to smooth consumption across goods.
In this case the preference shock would increase the autarky interest rate, which from equation
(14) can be dened as
Raut  uc(~c
c
1;
~hc1)
uc(c; h)
(18)
This is what the lower right panel of Figure 4 plots. The preference shock increases the marginal
utility of a tradable good in period 1. To ensure that the closed economy does not transfer
tradable goods across periods, the interest rate, which is the slope of the intertemporal budget
constraint, increases.
For preferences (7) the marginal utility of tradable consumption in the rst period is
uc(c1; h1) = (1  1)C
1
"
  1

1 c
 1
"
1 (19)
C1  ((1  1)c
" 1
"
1 + 1h
" 1
"
1 )
"
" 1 (20)
When the SES (") equals the IES () preferences are separable and uc(c1; h1) only depends
on the SES. The lower the SES, the less willing the household is to substitute housing and
tradable consumption within the period. As plotted in the upper right panel of Figure 4, the
unexpected increase in 1 increases h1 and decreases c1: This result holds for any parameter
value consistent with the concavity of the FPP and the convexity of the indi¤erence curves.
The more concave the FPP, the higher the drop in c1; since more resources need to reallocate
to produce an extra unit of housing. In addition, the lower the SES, the more likely that
the decrease in c1 increases uc(c1; h1) and autarky interest rates. Low SES households dislike
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unbalanced consumption across goods, thus an extra unit of the tradable good is valued more
when building houses forces the economy to reduce production and consumption of tradables.
When preferences are not separable (" 6= ), equation (19) shows that there may be a trade-
o¤ between intertemporal and intratemporal smoothing. Smoothing across goods may imply
unbalanced consumption across periods, something disliked by agents with low IES. Depending
on the value of the parameters it may happen that the increase in 1 decreases the marginal
utility of tradable consumption. From now on I will assume that the parameters satisfy the
conditions for uc(~cc1; ~h
c
1) to increase as 1 increases.
Fig. 4. The two period model with no durable good: the closed economy
If in the small open economy, or in a two country model, an increase in 1 does not increase
interest rates to the new autarky level, then the country will borrow and run a trade decit. The
trade decit allows better consumption smoothing across goods in the open economy. Figure
5 depicts this case. The increase in 1 shifts the marginal rate of substitution as in the closed
economy, but for the small economy the interest rate is exogenous and does not change. The
slope of the intertemporal budget constraint remains the same, although the budget constraint
shifts because both Yc1 and Yc2 will change. Now the economy does not have to move to point
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B, where consumption equals production. The small economy can instead consume at the
point C while producing at the point D of the upper right panel of Figure 5 if it respects its
intertemporal budget constraint (12); FOC (15) only requests that the slope of the indi¤erence
curve is the same at both points. Point C was not available for the closed economy because it
implies a transfer of tradable goods across periods. Interest rates raised to prevent this.
Fig. 5. The two period model with no durable good: the small open economy
4.2 Impulse responses in the full model
The full model of section 3 does not have a closed form solution. In this subsection I show
that for a reasonable parametrization, increases in the demand for housing generates trade
decits through net imports of consumption goods to smooth consumption.
I calibrate a world with two symmetric countries (i = 1; 2) that face di¤erent housing shocks:
If both countries face shocks of the same size, they are like closed economies. I assume that
both countries have the same population size. This allows me to study how domestic shocks
a¤ect the trade partners. The length of a period in the model is ve years. There are two sets
of parameters to choose:
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1. Preference parameters: I set the unconditional mean of the share of housing in
the economy (i ) to 0:2: This number is consistent with recent data on the weight of the
housing sector in the U.S. economy7 (The Economist 2005, Roubini 2006b). As discussed in
Section 4.1, for the mechanism to work there is a trade-o¤ between the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution () and the intratemporal elasticity between housing and tradable goods (").
There is no consensus in the literature about the value of these parameters. Most of the real
business cycle literature assumes  = 1
2
; which under CRRA preferences implies a value for
risk aversion of 2. I will follow this literature but many asset pricing models defend other
values8. Concerning "; I do not know of any papers that provide estimates of this parameter,
although some papers have estimated related concepts. For example Tesar (1993) estimates the
elasticity between traded and nontraded goods to be 0.44. Davis and Heathcote (2005) argue for
a unitary elasticity of substitution between non-housing consumption (without distinguishing
between tradables and nontradables) and housing. Piazzesi et al. (2007) claim that the elasticity
between non-housing consumption and housing is not one but it may be not be far from it (they
provide estimates based on Euler equations for excess returns that range between 1.17 and 1.24
but come with huge standard errors). Davido¤ and Yoshida (2008) obtain estimates for this
elasticity ranging from 0.4 to 0.9 and Kahn (2008) provides evidence based on both aggregate
and microeconomic data that is less than one. I use " = 0:9:
2. Technology parameters: I assume the same labor share across sectors and set it to
the standard  = 0:67. I choose the discount factor to match a steady state interest rate of
10%: For the depreciation of the stock of houses, I use the ve year equivalent of 2% annual
depreciation, h = 0:1; which is consistent with the BEA (2004) report that annual depreciation
rates for one-to-four-unit residential structures are between 1.1% and 3.6%. Concerning the
scale parameters I normalize n to 1 so nh is the labor share in construction. I set A to be 1=30,
which gives a construction labor share of 14% in a steady state with zero trade balance.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, in period zero I give an unanticipated housing
preference shock to country 1 that increases 1 from its unconditional mean  to 1 = 0:5. The
goal is not to be quantitative but to give a large enough increase to clearly show the mechanics
of the model. If country 2 had a shock of the same size, then both countries would behave
exactly as if they were closed economies.
7It is also in line with Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2010) that estimate the housing expenditure share in the U.S.
to be close to 0.25 from 1980 to 2000. Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2010) used renter data to compute expenditure
shares for housing and found this share to be stable over that period. Doms and Krainer (2007) examined data
on the share of household income devoted to housing by homeowners and report a substantial increase between
1997 and 2005.
8See Guvenen (2006) and Davido¤ and Yoshida (2008) for recent surveys.
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Figure 6 shows the results. After a housing preference shock, the country wants to con-
sume more housing services. Since these are not tradable, the country needs to build more
houses. This implies reallocating labor to the construction sector and sacricing production
of tradable goods. This happens both in the open and in the closed economy. The open
economy can decouple consumption decisions from production decisions because it can import
tradables for consumption. But the closed economy cannot. In the closed economy, build-
ing more houses requires reducing tradable consumption. This is an implicit adjustment cost,
because housing services and tradable consumption are complements the household wants to
smooth consumption across goods. The open and closed economies react di¤erently to the same
housing shock. Both reduce tradable consumption and reallocate labor towards construction,
but the open economy runs a trade decit importing tradables for consumption. This enables
a smaller reduction in tradable consumption and increased consumption of housing services.
These dynamics are shown in Figure 6.
Two prices govern the competitive equilibrium of this economy: i) the relative price of
housing services in terms of consumer tradables; and ii) the real interest rate, the price of
one unit of the tradable good today in terms of tradable goods tomorrow. The housing shock
implies an increase in the demand for housing. This translates into higher housing prices and
construction. Although the shock reduces preferences for tradable goods, tradables are valuable
because they allow smoothing of foregone consumption due to reallocation of labor to housing.
The increase in intertemporal demand requires interest rates to rise. In an open economy,
interest rates jump less than in a closed economy because country 2, by nancing a trade
decit, helps to satisfy demand for tradables in country 1.
Housing booms are larger in open economies that can run trade decits. This prediction
is conrmed by recent housing dynamics in the OECD. Girouard et al. (2006) document more
generalized housing upswings across OECD countries in recent years than in the past. These
upswings coincided with the OECD opening to trade with non-OECD economies and starting
to run an aggregate trade decit.
The model is a representative agent model and housing is not tradable. There are no wealth
e¤ects from a housing shock. But this does not preclude the housing boom from causing a
trade decit. Trade decits and housing reactions are quantitatively large in the model. This
happens because there are no frictions and because markets are complete. Finally, the absence
of frictions allows the economy to build the desired housing stock in a couple of periods.
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Fig. 6. Theoretical responses to an unexpected housing shock in country 1
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5 The Model and The Global Imbalances
The model discussed before is deliberately simple to highlight a mechanism ignored in the
housing literature. Simplicity comes at the expense of the quantitative abilities of the model.
However, in this section I show how the model can rationalize the global imbalances displayed
in Figure 2 using the housing variables as explanatory variables.
I perform the following experiment with the parameterized model of Section 4.2. I assume
that country 1 experiences a housing shock while country 2 does not. I simulate a series of
positive shocks in country 1 and obtain the reaction in both countries of the labor share in
construction, the production of new houses and the trade balance from the steady state to the
peak of the housing boom. For the current parameterization, this happens in the rst period,
i.e. in ve years, because in the absence of frictions the country can build very quickly. To label
the countries of Figure 2 as country 1 or country 2, I assume that positive housing movements
in Figure 2 come from country 1. Negative movements come from country 2. This introduces
a kink at zero in my simulation because, except for the trade balance, countries 1 and 2 do not
react symmetrically to a country 1 shock, as shown in the lower right panel of Figure 6. The
asymmetry arises because labor is nontradable. Country 1 adjusts via two channels after the
shock: it reallocates resources between its two sectors, and it runs a trade decit, which implies
resource reallocation in country 2. These two channels are not symmetric because labor can
only be reallocated domestically.
Figure 7 plots the results of the simulation. The top panel graphs the global imbalances
predicted by the model for a series of shocks that trace out the observed movements in the labor
share employed in construction between 1994 and 2006, as displayed on the horizontal axis. The
middle panel follows the same procedure but matches the change in the value added by the
construction sector observed in the data. The third panel matches the observed movements
in the housing prices. In all the simulations, countries with positive housing movements are
considered to be country 1 in the model. For both the value added and the labor share employed
in construction, the model generates current account dynamics very similar to the observed
global imbalances.
I interpret the previous result as evidence that, even if the model is too simple to be taken
as fully quantitative, the mechanism can help in explaining the correlation between housing
and trade dynamics. The next section explores an alternative empirical approach.
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Fig. 7. Data and model-predicted global imbalances
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6 Sign Restriction Identication
This section exploits sign restrictions provided by the model in Section 4.2 to identify
housing demand shocks and the mechanism described there from the forecast errors of a reduced
form vector autoregression. I estimate two vector autoregressions: rst using only the variables
of the model in a sample of OECD economies. The results mostly conrm the mechanism.
Second, I repeat the exercise for the U.S. and include the variables commonly used in the
SVAR literature to identify other economic shocks. The results suggest that the mechanism
may account for a non-trivial share of the variance of the trade balance forecasting error.
6.1 Identication
The model in Section 4.2 provides several sign restrictions summarized in Figure 6: con-
ditional on a positive shock, the correlation between the shock, interest rates, housing prices,
residential investment and employment in construction is positive. Moreover, the conditional
correlation of the shock with tradable consumption is negative. Any model would predict that
the increase in residential investment is positively correlated with an increase of employment
in construction. But the other four sign restrictions di¤er both from those identifying shocks
that do not originate in the housing sector, and from those of housing demand shocks which
operate through collateral constraints or aggregate wealth e¤ects. For example:
- Sector specic technology shocks do not imply increases in both house prices and quantities.
A negative shock to the technology used to produce tradables may imply higher employment
in construction, but the relative price of a house in terms of tradables would drop (producing
tradables in now less e¢ cient).
- Savings glut shocks or interest rate shocks (as risk premium shocks) would predict a
negative correlation between interest rates, housing prices and quantities. In those models
housing dynamics are caused by the interest rate shock, i.e. a drop in interest rates provokes
an increase in housing demand. In this paper the causality is reversed: something else increases
housing demand and this leads to higher interest rates to encourage the trade partner to nance
the decit.
- Neutral technology shocks or discount factor shocks (a standard way to generate aggregate
wealth e¤ects) do not generate negative comovement of housing and tradable consumption for
several periods because if both housing and tradable consumption are normal goods then higher
income, or higher impatience, increase householdsdemand for both goods, thus generating
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positive comovement (Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal 2010b, Punzi 2008). In Section 4.2 of this
paper the conditional correlation is negative, even if both housing and tradable consumption
are normal goods, because of two e¤ects that both push for lower tradable consumption. First,
it is a relative demand shock (the higher demand for housing implies a lower demand for
tradable goods). Second, housing is nontradable and labor is in xed supply (the workers
building houses are not producing tradables). For neutral technology shocks or impatience
shocks these two e¤ects work in opposite directions because the rst one becomes positive
(if the household is wealthier, or more impatient, and both goods are normal goods then she
wants more consumption of both). What would not imply negative conditional comovement if
the sign restrictions are imposed for a long enough number of periods. In fact, these shocks
operating through the mechanism of this paper would generate a higher trade decit than a
relative demand shock would, because the household wants to increase tradable consumption
while it is building houses (as shown in the upper left panel of Figure 6, with the relative
demand shock the household just borrows to mitigate the consumption drop, not to increase
tradable consumption).
6.2 Methodology
Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicoló (2002) and Uhlig (2005) have proposed di¤erent
ways to impose sign restrictions directly on impulse responses to identify economic shocks in a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR). I will follow Uhlig (2005), using an e¢ cient algorithm
proposed by Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2005) 9.
I start by estimating a reduced form VAR which contains the four variables central for my
identication: real nal consumption (C) ; employment in construction (Eh), real long term
interest rates (LTR), real housing prices (ph) and the trade balance/GDP ratio
 
NX
GDP

. I
estimate a VAR with four lags that I reformulate into the companion matrix VAR(1) form:
Yt = BYt 1 + ut (21)
9See Dedola and Neri (2007) for a recent survey of sign restriction identication and its advantages.
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where E (utu0t)   and
Yt 
26666664
logCt
logEht
LTRt
log pht
NXt
GDPt
37777775
I assume that the forecast errors (ut) and the structural shocks ("t) are related by
ut = A"t (22)
where E ("t"0t) = I: This implies that  = AA
0: The impulse responses to the economic shocks
are
@Yt+j
@"t
= BjA (23)
I want to identify the column of A associated with the housing shock. Without loss of
generality, I assume that the housing shock is the rst entry in "t: Denoting the ith variable in
Yt by Yit; I impose the following sign restrictions
@Y1t+j
@"1t
< 0;
@Y2t+j
@"1t
> 0;
@Y3t+j
@"1t
> 0;
@Y4t+j
@"1t
> 0 (24)
where j is the number of quarters during which I impose the sign restrictions. In the model
the number of quarters during which the restrictions hold depends on the calibration. Hence I
will compare the results using two di¤erent horizons, four and eight quarters. I do not impose
any restriction on NXt
GDPt
; since this is the variable of interest.
The matrix A is unique up to an orthonormal transformation, i.e., wherever QQ0 = I
then  = AQQ0A0: I need to search for the set of AQ matrices satisfying (24). I draw 1000
elements of that set.10
6.3 Results
My sample covers the period 1982:q1 to 2009:q4. Bems et al. (2007) provide several ar-
guments for starting in 1982. First, we want the sample to cover a period when trade was
10I followed the algorithm of Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2005): without loss of generality, I assume A = chol () ;
then I draw a matrix X; whose cells come from a standard normal distribution. Then I compute the QR
decomposition of X. I normalize the diagonal of R to be positive and check if AQ satises (24) : If it does, I keep
AQ, if not I discard and draw again. I keep drawing until I have 1000 successes.
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widely liberalized. Second, we also want to avoid both the structural break in monetary policy
associated with the appointment of Paul Volcker (Clarida et al. 2000) and the structural break
in the price of equipment reported by Fisher (2006). I estimate the VAR in levels of the logs
of the variables (except for the interest rates and the ratio Net Exports/GDP for which I do
not take logs). I do not model cointegration relationships, Sims et al. (1990) have shown that
the systems dynamics can be consistently estimated in a VAR in levels even in the presence of
unit roots. I also include a constant term.
Figures 8 and 9 report the range of impulse responses for the ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a
positive housing shock. Figure 8 has the sign restrictions imposed for one year, Figure 9 for two.
Sign restrictions are weak identication restrictions in the sense that they lead to a plurality
of candidate structural impulse responses. Figures 8 and 9 plot the set of impulse responses
satisfying the restrictions. The results in a sample of OECD economies mostly conrm that
positive housing shocks imply a trade decit through the consumption smoothing mechanism
discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
6.4 Quantitative importance
To assess the quantitative importance of the mechanism I estimate a VAR that also includes
the variables commonly used in the SVAR literature to identify other economic shocks: relative
price of equipment (pe), non farm business labor productivity (z) ; total government scal decit
(G), the price level (P ) ; and the Fed Funds rate (FF ). These are the variables used by Bems
et al. (2007) to perform a horserace across di¤erent shocks identied with short and long run
restrictions. They identify a scal shock, a neutral technology shock, an investment specic
shock and a monetary shock. However, my methodology only identies one shock, the housing
shock. I study the same period (1982:q1 to 2006:q4) than Bems et al. (2007) and compare two
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proxies for tradable consumption: consumer durables and nal consumption. Hence Yt is now
Yt 
266666666666666666664
log pet
log zt
Gt
logPt
FFt
logCt
logEht
LTRt
log pht
NXt
GDPt
377777777777777777775
and I impose the sign restrictions:
@Y6t+j
@"1t
< 0;
@Y7t+j
@"1t
> 0;
@Y8t+j
@"1t
> 0;
@Y9t+j
@"1t
> 0 (25)
Figure 10 contains the impulse responses for the ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a positive
housing shock. The rst column has the sign restrictions imposed for one year, the second for
two. The top row uses nal consumption as a proxy for tradable goods. The bottom row uses
consumer durables. The results are in line with Figures 8 and 9: a positive housing demand
shock and the consumption smoothing mechanism imply a trade decit.
Figure 11 computes the percentage of the variance of the trade balance forecasting error
that is attributable to a positive housing shock. I report the results for the same two proxies of
consumer tradables. The rst column has the sign restrictions imposed for one year, the second
for two. In Bems et al. (2007) scal and monetary shocks each account for around 10% of the
variance of changes in net trade/GDP at horizons of four and eight quarters, while neutral and
investment specic shocks account for roughly 5% each. Figure 11 shows that relative housing
demand shocks through the mechanism of this paper may account for similar magnitudes.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the debate on what caused
the global imbalances. I document that over the last decade there has been a strong cross-
country correlation between housing variables and current account dynamics. I present a simple
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model that shows that increases in the demand for nontradables relative to tradables imply
trade decits to smooth consumption between tradables and nontradables. I focus on housing,
which I model as a durable nontradable good. Then I provide two types of evidence that this
mechanism helps to explain recent global imbalances. A parameterized version of the model,
for observed cross-section housing movements, generates trade balance dynamics consistent
with recent OECD current account dynamics. Finally, housing demand shocks identied with
model-consistent sign restrictions in a SVAR help to explain the trade balance in a sample of
OECD economies.
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Fig. 8. Range of impulse responses for the ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a positive housing shock
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Fig. 9. Range of impulse responses for the ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a positive housing shock
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Fig. 10. Range of impulse responses for the U.S. ratio Trade Balance/GDP to a positive housing shock
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Fig. 11. Range of contribution of housing shocks to the U. S. variance of Trade Balance/GDP.
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Data sources
The series for current account and gross domestic product in Figures 1 and 2, and Table 1
are from the OECD. The series for labor share and value added from the construction sector
are obtained from Datastream, which collects these data from domestic sources. The real house
prices have been provided by the Bank of International Settlements and are compiled using
national sources.
The series in Figure 3 for the trade balance in goods and its decomposition come from Table
2a in the U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data published by the BEA.
In Section 6, I used the series described in Bems et al. (2007) together with quarterly data
on private nal consumption, employment in the construction sector, 10 year constant maturity
Government bond, CPI ination, housing prices and the trade balance from the OECD and
Datastream. The quarterly housing prices are described in Andre (2010).
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